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NOTE
WHEN REGULATION BECOMES
PERSONAL: ASSERTING
RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT
CLAIMS AGAINST REGULATORY
AGENCIES
Mark Brian Skerryt
INTRODUCTION
Joseph and Laura Kilkelly were proud business owners. They
owned and operated three assisted living facilities for the elderly
(known as "nursing homes") in Washington State.' In 2003, the Kilkellys decided to expand their business by leasing a fourth nursing
home.2 Unfortunately, the previous owner of the home had failed to
update the home in accordance with local fire codes and had allowed
the home's operating license to lapse with the state. 3 The Kilkellys
were committed to providing living assistance to low and mediumincome residents, and they concluded that the necessary renovations
would be too expensive to be completed all at once. 4 Joseph wrote
letters and made phone calls to the local administrative agency responsible for granting a new operating license, requesting a variance.
The agency had provided variances in the past, and the Kilkellys
hoped for similar treatment for their new nursing home. 6 Joseph also
began lobbying the state legislature for assistance in securing a new
operating license for the home on favorable terms.7
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2011;
B.S., Cornell University, 2007. The author would like to offer special thanks to Professor Sharona Hoffman for her guidance and reviews of earlier drafts of this Note.
CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 Id

Id.
See id. at 873-74.
A variance would have allowed the nursing home to continue operations
despite its failure to meet all of the regulatory requirements and conditions. See id
6 See id. n.2.
Id.
4
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The Kilkellys were denied the variance. Joseph became critical
of the agency; one email he sent to state senators was entitled "Example of [the agency's] inflexibility in applying the existing ruleschoosing control over whats [sic] best for public policy." 9 Over the
next few weeks, the agency conducted inspections of two of the Kilkellys' other nursing homes and issued citations claiming these homes
also did not meet the fire code.'o The timing of these inspections suggested that they were in retaliation for Joseph's criticisms." Following these inspections, one agency employee sent an email that read
"OK guys-I found an 'Ah Shit' in the pile."l 2 It would later be revealed to the Kilkellys that the agency was mounting a retaliatory
campaign against the Kilkellys' business in response to Joseph's critiCiMS 13
1
cisms.
The agency quickly conducted unannounced follow-up inspections and imposed immediate conditions on the cited nursing homes,
requiring them to:
(1) discharge all but two semi-ambulatory residents within 30
days; (2) hire staff within 24 hours who would be dedicated to
conducting 'fire watches 24 hours, 7 days per week'; (3) contact the fire marshal within 24 hours to discuss evacuation
plans; and (4) train staff and residents on evacuation plans
within 7 days. 14
Joseph was unable to afford the costs of these conditions." He
and his attorney repeatedly tried to contact the agency to negotiate or
discuss an alternative timeline for a sprinkler installation, but agency
officials refused to speak with him.' 6 An internal agency email noted
that Joseph was "MORE than ready to install a sprinkler system, and
[he couldn't] seem to get anyone to talk about that."' 7 The agency
revoked the Kilkellys' operating license several weeks later.' 8

See id
Id.
10 Id
SId at 878.
12 Id at 873.
8

o

" See id
14

id

"s Id at 874.
16
17

Id
id

18 Id The Kilkellys ultimately filed a retaliation claim against the agency.
The defendant regulatory agency filed a motion to dismiss, but the motion was denied
by the trial court. The denial was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. Id. at 884.
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The Kilkellys' situation is not an isolated occurrence. Unfortunately, there have been numerous instances when regulatory agencies
have used their enforcement powers to punish nursing home operators
and other healthcare organizations for exercising their constitutionally-protected freedoms of speech.' 9 Often, these agencies have the
power to cripple small businesses through retaliatory enforcement. 20
The United States healthcare system places considerable importance on healthcare quality and patient safety. 2 1 Accordingly, the federal and state governments heavily regulate the healthcare industry.2 2
The federal government alone has created many healthcare regulatory
agencies with enforcement powers, including the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.23
One commentator has noted that this regulation has created tension between the advantages of public protection and private market
forces.24 For example, medical licensing provides one of the best
ways to protect the public from unqualified doctors and unsafe healthcare facilities. 2 5 Unfortunately, it also drives up the costs of healthcare, preventing less qualified healthcare professionals from providing
less expensive services to those in need of medical attention.26
Similarly, nursing home regulations may create barriers for those
trying to obtain long term care, such as the low-income residents at
19 See, e.g., CarePartners,545 F.3d at 867; Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d
545 (7th Cir. 2008); Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2006); Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995).
20 U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., About the Office of the National Ombudsman,

http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/ombudsman/aboutus/OMBUD_ABOUTU
S.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
21 See VIRGINA A. SHARPE, PROMOTING PATIENT SAFETY: AN ETHICAL BASIS

FOR POLICY DELIBERATION S3 (Supp. 2003),

available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/pdf/patient safety.pdf ("Over the last
three years, patient safety and the reduction of medical error have come to the fore as
significant and pressing matters for policy reform in U.S. health care.").
22 Ginger L. Graham, Influencing Governmental Decision Making: The Role
of CorporateLeadership, in GOVERNMENT RELATIONS INTHE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

181, 181 (Peggy Leatt & Joseph Mapa eds., 2003).
23 Wanda Lockwood, What Are Health Care Regulatory Agencies?, EHOW
http://www.ehow.com/about_5187634_health-care-regulatory(Dec. 1, 2009),
agencies.html.
24 ROBERT 1. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 40 (2007).
25

Id.

26 Jillian Melchior, Medical Licensing Impedes Quality, Affordability of
Care, HEALTH CARE NEWS (Dec. 2008), http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2008-12-01-

HCN-KH.pdf.
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the Kilkellys' nursing homes. Our society today considers medical
care to be a necessity good, not a luxury.27 Some nursing homes may
provide care that does not meet regulatory standards for those individuals that would otherwise not have been able to afford any care. Consequently, an inadequate number of medically licensed nurses and
nurse practitioners on staff at nursing homes has been seen as one of
the fundamental causes of problems at nursing homes.28 According to
data collected in federal surveys and inspections, "25-33% of nursing
homes had serious or potentially life threatening problems in delivering care and were harming residents." 29 Thus, there is tension in the
industry between providing care at a cost that is affordable to residents and bearing the costs incurred in meeting regulatory standards.
The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services reported that nursing homes file over 700 administrative appeals each year in response to negative inspection findings,
even though the homes would have received a 35 percent decrease in
penalty fees if they waived the appeal.30 In other words, a substantial
number of nursing homes forego a reduction in their penalty fees,
believing that the regulatory authorities were mistaken and that their
appeals will be sustained. Only those nursing homes that consider
their claims to be valid would abandon this incentive. As noted by the
Second Circuit in Blue v. Koren, "[n]ursing homes are a highly regulated industry, and some tension between operators of homes and regulators is to be expected" due to their frequent adversarial relations. 3 1
Regulatory agencies need enforcement powers to regulate the
healthcare industry effectively and maintain a high quality of care.
27 JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY 167 (2009). See
also JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM xi ("[D]emand for health care is

consistently found to be price inelastic. Although the range of price elasticity estimates is relatively wide, it tends to center on -0. 17, meaning that a 1 percent increase
in the price of health care will lead to a 0.17 percent reduction in health care expendi-

tures.").
28 Charlene Harrington, Regulating Nursing Homes: Residential Nursing

Facilitiesin the United States, 323 BMJ 507, 508 (2001).
29 Id. at 507 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-46,
NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999)); see also Cindy George, Feds' New Ratings of
Nursing Homes Draw Questions, HoUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 2008, at B4 (noting
that more than half of Texas nursing homes were subpar on a new federal nursing
home rating scale created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
30 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
OEI-06-02-00720, NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: THE USE OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTIES (2005).

3' 72 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Yet how these powers are used must be subject to scrutiny. When
administrative regulation infringes upon constitutionally protected
activities, healthcare businesses must have an effective avenue of relief. Otherwise, business owners that lobby or publicly speak out may
find themselves unjustly targeted by an enforcement agency. This
Note will identify the circumstances under which individuals and
healthcare organizations may maintain a cause of action against a regulatory agency when the organization suffers retaliatory enforcement
in response to its constitutionally protected activity. It will also address the standards the plaintiff must meet to prevail.
Part I will analyze the causes of action plaintiffs can invoke in retaliatory enforcement cases, including Section 1983 claims and Bivens
actions. It will also discuss issues of judicial review for federal administrative agencies.
Part II will discuss the elements a plaintiff must establish to prevail in a retaliatory enforcement action. It identifies a divergence between three federal circuits in the language each uses in its retaliatory
enforcement analytic framework. Generally, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the government's retaliatory motive
and the retaliation.32 The Second Circuit requires plaintiffs to show
that a retaliatory motive is the reason for the enforcement. 33 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit requires only that the retaliatory intent be a
factor motivating the enforcement action. 4 The Ninth Circuit takes a
more speculative approach, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
retaliatory action could have been a motivating factor.35
The standard this Note advocates is that the retaliatory motive
must be a substantialfactor in prompting the enforcement action. This
language is drawn from Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, a Supreme Court retaliatory dismissal case.36
While Mount Healthy involved a different cause of action-retaliatory
dismissal instead of retaliatory enforcement-its legal analysis
framework strikes an appropriate balance between the Constitutional
interests of the plaintiff and the operational interests of the agency.
Mount Healthy also created a safe-harbor for government agencies
that should apply in retaliatory enforcement claims.37 If the regulatory
32

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285

33

Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.

(1977).
2006).
34 Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).

CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2008).
36 429 U.S. 274.

n Id. at 285, 287.

HEALTH MATRIX

284

[[Vol. 21:279

agency can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in
the absence of the retaliatory motive, the regulatory agency should
prevail in the action.
Part III will argue against the applicability of a public concern requirement in retaliatory enforcement claims within the private sector
of the healthcare industry. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court found that government employees have a heightened
pleading standard in retaliatory dismissal claims.38 These employees
have a First Amendment right to speak on "issues of public importance" only when the government's interest in limiting the employee's
opportunity to contribute to a public debate is not significantly greater
than its interest in limiting "a similar contribution by any member of
the general public."3 9 Some regulatory agencies have argued that this
heightened standard should also be applied to healthcare organizations
in retaliatory enforcement claims. 4 0 Healthcare organizations are not
government employees, nor are they generally associated with government agencies. This eliminates the policy reasons behind imposing
such a public concern requirement.

I. CAUSES OF ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Causes of Action for Retaliatory Enforcement Claims
Plaintiffs asserting retaliatory enforcement claims against state
regulatory agencies may invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) for
federal court subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, if a state's enforcement activity is so severe that it results in an individual's deprivation of a constitutional right, that individual may bring a claim under Section 1983.41 Both individuals and healthcare organizations are
entitled to bring Section 1983 claims. 4 2 In order to bring a retaliatory
enforcement suit under a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) the plaintiff experienced a deprivation of a constitutionally
protected activity, (2) the deprivation was the result of conduct by a
government agency or official acting under color of law, and (3) there
was a causal relationship between the retaliatory motive and the enforcement action that leads to the deprivation. 43 The plaintiff must
3 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
39

Id. at 573.

See CarePartners,545 F.3d at 879.
41' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
42 Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation,
in SwoRD
AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1, 14 (Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 2006).
43 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
40
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establish each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence to
prevail."
Plaintiffs may also bring retaliatory enforcement claims against
federal officials and agencies. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied cause
of action against federal agents who deprive citizens of constitutional
rights. 4 5 The requirements for proving a Bivens claim are substantially
similar to those of a Section 1983 claim, and a Bivens claim establishes an analogous cause of action against federal employees for retaliatory enforcement claims.4 6
Plaintiffs prevailing in a Section 1983 or Bivens claim can recover
compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violation.4 7
Compensatory damages are calculated according to common-law
principles, and are based upon actual injury suffered by the plaintiff. 48
Punitive damages are available to the plaintiff when the government
agency or official acts "with a malicious or evil intent or in callous
disregard of the plaintiffs federally protected rights." 4 9 Attorney's
fees are also available to the prevailing party in a Section 1983 claim,
at the discretion of the court.50
B. Judicial Review for Federal Regulatory Agencies
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) enables federal regulatory agencies to create and enforce regulations pertinent to their mandated jurisdiction." It also defines the circumstances in which judicial
review of agency action is appropriate. 5 2 The Supreme Court has interpreted the APA to create a presumption of judicial reviewability for
4 Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. Leatherberry, 706 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Wis. 2005); see also Schwartz, supranote 42, at 4.
45 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
46 James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125 (2009) ("Bivens thus provides a
federal law analog to the right of individuals to bring constitutional tort claims against
state and local government officials. But in contrast to suits against state actors, which
rest on § 1983, no federal statute authorized individuals in the position of [the plaintiff] to sue federal officials.").
47 Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64-65.
48 Memphis Cmty. School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); see also
Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64.
Schwartz, supra note 42, at 64-65 (citing Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800 (9th
4
Cir. 2005)).
50 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b); see also Schwartz, supra note 42, at 66 (describing attorney's fees as an
"integral part" of § 1983 remedies).
s' Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (2006).
52 Id. § 701.
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administrative action, particularly when an agency's implementing
legislation is silent on the agency's reviewability.53
In Heckler v. Chaney, however, the Supreme Court strayed from
this presumption 54 and interpreted the APA to provide government
agencies with presumptively non-reviewable discretion for some of
their decisions regarding whether to enforce regulations. In Heckler,
a prisoner on death row sought an injunction that would require the
Federal Drug Administration to investigate whether the chemicals
used in lethal injections for capital punishment violated the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.56 The Supreme Court refused to require such an investigation. 57 Unless the petitioner's claim alleges a
constitutional violation, "courts generally will defer to an agency's
construction of [a] statute it is charged with implementing, and to the
procedures it adopts for implementing the statute."5 8
Heckler established the presumption against judicial review of an
agency's decision not to enforce a regulation.59 One commentator has
noted, however, that it did not overturn the "long established presumption of review . . . in factual circumstances warranting judicial
intervention for the protection of fundamental rights and for the prevention of abuse of authority."60 The Heckler decision notes that its
holding does not apply to cases concerning a violation of a constitutional right. 6 1 Because retaliatory enforcement claims, by definition,
allege a constitutional deprivation, such claims are presumptively
reviewable and Heckler does not apply. Retaliatory enforcement
claims are therefore presumptively reviewable by federal courts.

5 William W. Templeton, Note, Heckler v. Chaney: The New Presumption
of Nonreviewability of Agency Enforcement Decisions, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 1099,
1109, 1111 (1986) (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)). Agencies
can rebut this presumption if the implementing legislation specifically precludes
judicial review. Id. at 1108-09.
5
See Templeton, supra note 53, at 1124-25.
ss See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
56 Id. at 823-24.
1 Id. at 838.
5

Id. at 832.

59 See Templeton, supra note 53, at 1105 ("[Heckler] firmly established the
application of the prosecutorial discretion doctrine to administrative law proceedings
by denying review of agency enforcement decisions. Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Rehnquist held an agency decision not to investigate alleged statutory violations to be a valid exercise of an agency's enforcement discretion, precluded from
judicial review by section 701 (a)(2) of the [Administrative Procedure Act].").
6 Templeton, supra note 53, at 1130.
6 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838.
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II. ESTABLISHING EACH SECTION 1983 ELEMENT
IN A RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT CLAIM
A. Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutionally Protected
Activity
While Section 1983 and Bivens actions can be brought for deprivations of any constitutionally protected activity, retaliatory enforcement claims in the healthcare industry are usually prompted by
attempts to punish or suppress speech protected by the First Amendment. Nursing homes in several cases have engaged in First Amendment activities such as publicly criticizing the regulatory agency,62
lobbying legislators to change the regulatory agency's policies and
63
decisions, challenging an administrative agency's findings through
an administrative judicial process,6 and filing lawsuits against the
regulatory agency.6 5 In each of these situations, the regulatory agency
allegedly reacted to the First Amendment activity through excessive
or unreasonable enforcement, thus forming the basis for the retaliatory
enforcement claim.66
A majority of retaliatory enforcement claims concern free speech
as the constitutionally protected activity, and courts often frame the
constitutional deprivation with respect to the limitations on future
First Amendment activity.67 For example, the Seventh Circuit requires
the plaintiff bringing retaliatory enforcement claims to have: (1) engaged in First-Amendment activity, and (2) suffered a "deprivation
[from a regulatory agency] that would likely deter First Amendment
activity in the future."68
Retaliatory enforcement typically satisfies the deprivation requirement because, as courts have found, "[g]overnment retaliation
tends to chill an individual's exercise of his First Amendment
rights

. ..

"69 As the Ninth Circuit noted in CarePartnersv. Lashway,

"state action designed to retaliate against and chill political expression
strikes at the heart of the First Amendment." 70 Once retaliation ocSee CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 2008).
See id.
6 See Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995).
65 See Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2008); Beechwood
Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 2006).
66 CarePartners,545 F.3d at 877; Beechwood, 436 F.3d at 150; Woodruff
542 F.3d at 549; Blue, 72 F.3d at 1080.
67 See, e.g., Woodruff 542 F.3d at 551.
68 Id.
62
61

69

Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).

70 CarePartners,545 F.3d at 877 (citing Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan,

874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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curs, individuals will be less likely to speak in the future for fear of
punishment by the regulatory agency. 71 Therefore, the constitutionally
protected activity is not the speech that leads to the retaliation, but
rather the future speech that would have taken place but for the chilling effects of the retaliation. 7 2
Accordingly, in the Kilkellys' case described in the introduction,
the constitutionally protected activity establishing their Section 1983
claim was not Joseph's lobbying for a variance or his administrative
appeals. Instead, it was the constitutionally protected lobbying and
appeals the Kilkellys would have commenced in the future, but for the
resulting fear of retaliation resulting from the agency's predatory enforcement.73
B. Establishing That the Conduct Was By a Person Acting Under
the Color of State Law
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the retaliatory enforcement was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 74 The actions of individuals acting in their private capacity are not subject to
Section 1983 claims.7" This issue, however, is rarely contested in retaliatory enforcement claims because the enforcement decision, which
is at the heart of the claim itself, by definition involves the improper
exercise of administrative regulations.
C. Establishing a Causal Link Between a Retaliatory Motive and
the Enforcement Action
Federal courts have also required a causal link between a demonstrated retaliatory motive and the improper enforcement. Courts diverge, however, in determining what burden to place on the plaintiff.

See CarePartners,545 F.3d at 877.
See id.
" See id. at 878.
74 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
7 See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 23 ("[P]ersons victimized by tortious
conduct of private parties must ordinarily explore other avenues of redress." (quoting
Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 1996))).
71

72
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1. Plaintiffs Must First Provide at Least Some Evidence of the
Presence of a Retaliatory Motive That Was
a Factor in the Decision to Take the
Enforcement Action
When there is no direct evidence of retaliatory motive, summary
judgment for the regulatory agency is appropriate. 76 In Blue v. Koren,
a nursing home filed a Section 1983 claim against the New York Department of Health for "unreasonable, duplicative and retaliatory inspections" of its facilities.7 7 To qualify for Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements, the nursing home had to undergo annual inspections
78
by the Department. During a normal inspection, the Department
cited the nursing home for violating state regulations by using a method of naso-gastric tube feeding that the Department considered medically unsound. 79 The nursing home challenged the Department's determination, and the challenge was heard by a state administrative law
judge.80 The judge overturned the determination, finding that the feeding practice did not violate state law.81
Over the next several months, the Department conducted four
separate inspections that were significantly more rigorous in duration
and scope than federal guidelines recommended. The inspectors reported several significant deficiencies at the nursing home and moved
to terminate the home's ability to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.82
The nursing home brought a retaliatory enforcement action
against the Department in federal court, asserting that this unreasonably harsh treatment constituted "retaliatory harassment" for the nursing home's successful challenge of the tube-feeding determination.8 3
The district court denied the Department's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Department had not committed a constitutional violation and that it was entitled to qualified immunity.84 The
Second Circuit reversed, granting summary judgment for the Depart-

Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
n Id. at 1078.
" Id. at 1079.
7 Id.
80 id
76

81 Id.
8

Id. at 1079-80.
Id. at 1080.

84

Id.

82
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ment.85 The court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had
failed to "offer specific evidence of improper motivation."86
The frequency and rigor of the agency's regulatory enforcement
alone were insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory motive. 87 The court
noted that "[t]he particularized evidence of improper motive may include expressions by the officials involved regarding their state of
mind, circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion that the plaintiff has been singled out, or the highly unusual nature of the actions
taken."88 However, the nursing home in Blue provided "no particularized statements by state officials indicating a retaliatory motive," the
timing of the surveys alleged to be retaliatory was established by federal regulation, and the rigor of the inspections were not unusual in
the industry.
2. Plaintiff Must Demonstrate That the Retaliatory Motive Prompted
the Enforcement Action
After establishing the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part
of the agency, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the motive
caused the agency to engage in the retaliatory enforcement. The language used by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits has diverged,
however, concerning the appropriate standard to use when weighing
whether causation is present.
In Beechwood Restorative Care Center v. Leeds, the Second Circuit followed its reasoning in Blue, and required the plaintiff to provide direct evidence that the agency's pursuit of his company was
specifically motivated by a desire to punish him for exercising his
First Amendment-protected right to litigation.90 Tensions grew between his nursing home and the New York Department of Health in
light of a series of escalating disputes over deficiencies reported during Department inspections. 9 1 The Department ultimately revoked the
nursing home's operating certificate, imposed a fine of $54,000, and
drove the nursing home property into foreclosure. 9 2
The Second Circuit reversed summary judgment for the Department, finding that the nursing home had provided sufficient evidence
" Id. at 1083-84.
86
87
88

8
90

id
Id at 1084.
id
Id at 1084-85.
Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.

2006).
9'
92

Id. at 149.
Id. at 151.
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to demonstrate that the Department's "campaigning against the [nursing home was] retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment
rights."9 3 The nursing home provided affidavits with testimony that
the Department officials responsible for the inspections stated that
they "were going to get" the owners of the home because they had
been "harassed by [the nursing home operators]."9 The nursing home
also provided emails between Department officials rejoicing over the
certificate revocation, "with exclamations of 'AMEN &
HALLELUAH' and 'HOT DIGGITY DAWG' (followed by 50 exclamation marks)." 9 5
Beechwood Restorative Care's language suggests that the Second
Circuit requires plaintiffs to show that a retaliatory motive was the
reason for the enforcement. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in
Woodruff v. Mason required only that the retaliatory motive be a factor motivating the enforcement action.96
In Woodruff, a chain of long-term nursing facilities asserted a
Section 1983 claim against Indiana regulatory agencies for predatory
enforcement. Tensions developed between the chain and the agencies
over a series of lawsuits attempting to recoup reimbursements withheld by Medicare. 9 7 The chain claimed that it had a "perfect record of
compliance with state regulations over the first thirty-two years of its
operation," but experienced a "deluge of allegedly predatory enforcement actions" subsequent to its reimbursement litigation. 9 8 The chain
alleged that this "enforcement campaign" was an attempt to drive the
chain out of business, as demonstrated by the manipulation of several
inspection reports. 99 The court determined that the nursing home did
not need to demonstrate that the litigation surrounding the reimbursements was "the only factor" that motivated the defendants, but "must
show that it was a motivating factor."100 Ultimately, the court affirmed
a summary judgment for the defendant agencies because the chain
could not demonstrate that the litigation was a motivating factor in the
enforcement.

1o0

In CarePartnersLLC v. Lashway, the Ninth Circuit relaxed the
causation standard set forth by the Second and Seventh Circuits, re9

94

Id. at 154.

id

s Id. at 153-54.
96 Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
1 Id. at 548.
98 Id. at 549.
9 Id
100 Id. at 551 (citing Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted).
'01Id at 553

2HEALTH MA TRIX
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quiring the plaintiff to demonstrate only that the speech could have
been a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory enforcement.10 2 CarePartnersis the decision from which the Kilkellys' situation, discussed previously in the introduction, is drawn.
In CarePartners, Kilkelly-the owner of a chain of nursing
homes-sought a variance for a nursing home he had recently purchased. 103 The home did not comply with the state's recently-modified
building codes, but Kilkelly had hoped the state would treat it as an
"existing facility . . . 'grandfathering' the facility in under the old
code."1"0 Kilkelly also commenced a lobbying campaign with state
legislators, criticizing the decisions of the regulatory agency officials.s05 Following this campaign, state officials conducted several
inspections of two of Kilkelly's other homes, citing numerous fire
code violations. The officials required Kilkelly to remedy the fire
code violations immediately, but Kilkelly thought that the remedies
constituted a significant and unreasonable financial burden.106
Kilkelly and his attorney made several attempts to discuss alternative
solutions to the violations with the regulatory agency, but07"those officials either refused to talk or would not engage in talks."'1
The court determined that the owner had provided enough evidence to establish a retaliatory enforcement claim for four reasons.
First, the timing of the inspections was suspiciously close to the owner's First Amendment-protected activity.' 0 8 Second, agency officials
had declared that they were "quickly losing patience" with the owner.109 Third, the agency was actively seeking ways to take enforcement action against the nursing homes before discovering the fire
code violations." 0 Fourth, the officials deliberately avoided resolution discussions with the owner."' The court held that the plaintiff
had demonstrated that his "protected expression may well have been a
substantial factor in the State employee's aggressive enforcement decisions."ll The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, deCarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 2008) ("CarePartners has demonstrated that [the owner's] protected expression may well have
been a substantial factor in the State employee's aggressive enforcement decisions.").
102

'03 Id. at 872.
'0 Id. at 872-73.
'05 Id. at 873.
106
07

Id.
Id at 874.

'0 Id. at 878
o9 Id

Id
no Id
112 Id. (emphasis added).
110
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clining
to decide a case that might have resolved this circuit dispari3
tyl'1

The Ninth Circuit standard enunciated in CarePartnersrepresents
a significantly reduced burden for the plaintiff. It changes the nature
of the question into a speculative inquiry. Instead of requiring that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the protected expression was at least a motivating factor, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit must only demonstrate
that the expression could have been a motivating factor.
The Ninth Circuit standard may cause significant problems in the
healthcare industry, so as to tip the balance too far toward the interests
of nursing home owners. Increased regulation leads to regular and
frequent conflict between healthcare organizations and government
regulatory agencies. As noted in the introduction, nursing homes and
healthcare organizations often are at odds with government regulatory
agencies through lobbying and litigation.114 A standard that would
allow a suit to move forward based upon a finding that the protected
expression could have been a motivating factor would be too easy to
meet and would effectively destroy an agency's ability to pursue legitimate enforcement actions against organizations when tensions are
strained between the agency and the organization. This would hinder
the goals of regulatory agencies that are attempting to maintain a high
level of healthcare quality.
Yet it would also be inappropriate to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that the retaliatory motive is the only reason for the enforcement
action, as suggested by the Second Circuit in Beechwood Restorative
Care. This too would disrupt the balance between regulatory agencies' interests and the First Amendment interests of organizations and
individuals, favoring regulatory agencies too heavily. It may be impossible for the plaintiff to eliminate all legitimate motivating factors
that a regulatory official might be able to suggest.
3. Proposal to Resolve the Divergence: Adopt the
Supreme Court's Retaliatory Dismissal Standard from Mount Healthy
Instead of indulging in speculation or placing a virtually insurmountable burden on the plaintiff, courts should adopt the Supreme
Court's causation standard from Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, which provides a reasonable balance
between an organization's First Amendment interest and the agency's
interest in operating effectively. In 1977-prior to the federal circuits'
113 Lashway v. CarePartners, L.L.C., 545 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. de-

nied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009).
114 Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (2d Cir. 1995).

HEALTH MA TRIX

294

[Vol. 21:279

divergence-Mount Healthy created the general legal framework for
analyzing government retaliation claims. 115 The case arose after a
school board refused to renew a teacher's employment contract."l 6
The teacher had been involved in several arguments with school staff
and was disciplined for making obscene gestures to his students. 1 17 He
also sent his objections to the school's new dress code to a local radio
station, which aired his opinions as a news item.1 ' 8 He was subsequently terminated by the school." 9
The Court found that his activities, particularly the comments to
the radio station, were protected by the First Amendment.120 By producing a letter from the superintendant indicating that he was discharged because of his speech, the teacher had demonstrated to the
court a causal link between his protected activity and the retaliatory
action.121 The Court determined that he had met the necessary burden
of demonstrating that the retaliatory motive was a substantialmotivatingfactor in the agency's action.12 2
There are two possible reasons for the divergence of the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on the retaliatory motive element from
Mount Healthy's original retaliation framework. First, Mount Healthy
was a case of retaliatory dismissal, not retaliatory enforcement.123
Courts may have considered the firing of an employee to be factually
distinguishable from predatory enforcement actions against businesses. Thus Mount Healthy would be only persuasive authority. Indeed,
commentators have identified numerous instances where retaliatory
case law deviates from Mount Healthy's general framework, particularly in the retaliatory prosecution and arrest context. 124 Circuits have
also deviated from the Mount Healthy standard when deciding retaliation suits involving plaintiffs that are prisoners,1 25 when the alleged
"' Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977).
116

"

Id. at 282.
Id. at 281-82.

"' Id. at 282.
l9 Id
120
121
122

Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 284.
id

See id. at 276.
See John Koerner, Note, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause
in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 755, 756 ("Notwithstanding the
general applicability of Mt. Healthy to retaliation cases, courts have carved out a
number of exceptions to its pleading standards, based on various policy or evidentiary
concerns." (footnote omitted)).
125 Some circuits have placed greater pleading standards on prisoners asserting retaliatory enforcement claims, deviating from Mount Healthy. The Eighth and
123

124
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retaliation is a civil counterclaim suit, 126 and when a retaliatory dismissal case involves after-acquired evidence. 12 Accordingly, while
Mount Healthy appears to have provided a general foundation for retaliation analysis, it has not been interpreted to constitute a strict legal
framework for such cases.
Second, the divergence of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on the retaliatory motive element from Mount Healthy's original
retaliation framework may have been simple inadvertence - the different standards may have been mistakenly and unintentionally
adopted. At first blush, the divergence may have been seen as benign;
no circuits address the reasons why their standards deviate from
Mount Healthy. As previously noted, however, the deviations can lead
to incongruous results across the circuits.
Adopting Mount Healthy's standard for retaliatory enforcement
cases would be advantageous for three reasons. First, it would resolve
the discrepancies between the standards of the Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. Second, it would restore the circuits' standards to that
of the original framework precedent proposed by the Supreme Court
in Mount Healthy. Finally, the Mount Healthy standard strikes an appropriate balance between a healthcare organization's First Amendment interests and a regulatory agency's interest in operating
effectively. Plaintiffs would not need to meet the overly burdensome
standard that requires the retaliation to be the sole motivating factor.
Instead, plaintiffs would need to show only that retaliation was at least
a substantial motivating factor. Use of the Mount Healthy standard
would therefore also eliminate the speculative nature of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in CarePartners, where the plaintiff need only
demonstrate that the speech could have been a motivating factor.

Ninth Circuits are particularly strict, automatically dismissing retaliatory suits arising
from disciplinary violations in prison. Other circuits strictly follow Mount Healthy's
standard. Id. at 765.
126 Government officials "enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts,
and arguably cannot be prevented from bringing even a retaliatory counterclaim unless the counterclaim is baseless." While there is disparity among the circuits as to the
appropriate treatment of this situation, "fn]o Court applies an unmodified version of
the Mt. Healthy standard."Id. at 766-67.
127See id. at 767-68 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-63, resolving the budding
circuit split on Mount Healthy's application to instances of after-acquired evidence of
resume fraud, embezzlement, and other serious forms of misconduct in retaliatory
dismissal cases).
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4. The Defendant Should Be Able to Rebut the
Plaintiffs Demonstration of Causation by Showing that the Same
Action Would Have Been Taken,
Regardless of the Motive
The Court in Mt. Healthy ultimately remanded the case for further
proceedings. 12 8 The Court implemented a burden-shifting standard
after the plaintiff met his initial burden, providing the defendant
school board with the opportunity to prove "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the
teacher's] re-employment even in the absence of the protected conduct."l 29
The Court essentially instituted a no-harm, no-foul rule. It noted
that "[t]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if
[the plaintiff] is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct."' 30 While the Second Circuit in Beechwood and
the Seventh Circuit in Woodruff did not discuss this burden-shifting
analysis, the Ninth Circuit in CarePartnersadopted the no-harm, nofoul rule for retaliatory enforcement claims, citing Mt. Healthy.13'
This burden-shifting standard, if uniformly adopted, would have
important implications in the retaliatory enforcement context. If a
regulatory agency is able to demonstrate that the plaintiff would have
been subject to the enforcement action, regardless of his First
Amendment conduct, the regulatory agency should prevail in the suit.
Under this scheme, a regulatory agency would prevail in a retaliatory
enforcement claim if it could demonstrate that it would have taken the
same enforcement action in the absence of a retaliatory motive, even if
the actual motivatingfactor was retaliatoryin nature.
This defense for regulatory agencies is important for two reasons.
First, it would alleviate officials' concerns about being sued if they
take enforcement action against a healthcare organization with which
they have had disagreements in the past. It would provide them with
the peace of mind that if the target healthcare organization alleged
retaliatory enforcement, there would be no liability if the agency's
actions were legitimate. Second, the standard would prevent individuals from hiding behind the First Amendment when they know they are
violating regulations and are legitimately subject to enforcement pro128

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977).
129

id
Id. at 285-86.
131 See CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287).
13o
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ceedings. Such a standard would therefore prevent individuals from
exercising First Amendment rights specifically for the purpose of insulating themselves from penalties for regulatory violations.
5. Analogizing Retaliatory Arrest to Retaliatory
Enforcement: Proving an Absence of Probable
Cause Should Not Be Necessary for
Retaliatory Enforcement Claims
Several regulatory agencies have argued during litigation that the
heightened pleading standards found in retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution case law should be imputed to retaliatory enforcement claims. 132 These agencies draw parallels to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hartman v. Moore, where the Court required plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest claims to demonstrate an absence
of probable cause for the arrest in order to prevail.13 3 While circuit
courts disagree on whether to adopt this standard for retaliatory enforcement claims, this Note argues that such adoption would be inappropriate.
The claim in Hartman arose from the U.S. Postal Service's refusal
to purchase mail-routing machines from a company owned by the
plaintiff.134 In an attempt to convince the Postal Service to purchase
his machines, the plaintiff lobbied Congress and criticized highranking officials at the Postal Service.' 35 The Postal Service's enforcement division then conducted a series of unrelated criminal investigations targeting the plaintiff, allegedly in retaliation for the
plaintiffs lobbying activities and criticisms. 13 6
The plaintiff brought a Bivens action against the postal office officials, claiming that the resulting criminal prosecutions were retaliation
against his First Amendment lobbying activities. The Postal Service
argued in turn that plaintiffs in retaliatory arrest cases must demonstrate a lack of probable cause to prevail.137 Under this proposed
See, e.g., CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 877 n.7 ("The State employees would
also have us impose a requirement on [the plaintiff] to plead and prove an 'absence of
probable cause' with respect to [the agency's] enforcement decisions, relying on
Hartman v. Moore." (citation omitted)).
1
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 252 (2006).
134 Id. at 253.
135 id
136 While the US Attorney's office often conducts federal criminal proceedings, it was the US Postal Service's internal criminal investigation division that initiated this investigation. See id.
137 Id. at 257. The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925); see
also John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third
132
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pleading standard, the plaintiff in Hartman would have had the burden
to establish the absence of any probable cause that would have led the
Postal Service to begin its criminal investigations independently.' 38
The Supreme Court in Hartman recognized that the circuits were
divided on whether to require the plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of
probable cause in retaliatory arrest and prosecution cases. 39 The
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits required the plaintiff to allege
and prove the absence of probable cause,14 0 while the Tenth Circuit
and District of Columbia Circuit imposed no such requirement.'41 In
resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must
demonstrate the absence of probable cause to establish a cause of action for retaliatory prosecution and retaliatory arrest cases.142
The Court relied on two justifications for this heightened standard. First, in retaliatory prosecution claims, there are underlying
criminal legal proceedings. Thus, "there will always be a distinct body
of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available and apt to prove
or disprove retaliatory causation, namely evidence showing whether
there was or was not probable cause to bring the criminal charge." 4 3
Evidence of whether there was probable cause "will tend to reinforce
the retaliation evidence and show that retaliation was the but-for basis
for instigating prosecution."' 4 4 The Court reasoned that the prevalence
of this evidence would mean that litigation over the presence of probable cause would normally take place,14 5 and a lack of probable cause
would be highly probative in demonstrating the causation requirement
in the subsequent retaliation case, without adding any significant costs
for the plaintiff.14 6 Accordingly, the Court determined that it "makes
sense" to require plaintiffs to demonstrate a lack of probable cause.147
Second, retaliatory prosecution claims require the plaintiff to
demonstrate a "complex connection" between the motive and the retaliation, because the individual harboring the retaliatory motive is not
the one who commits the constitutional deprivation in these cases.148
Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1104
n.240 (2007) (discussing the definition of probable cause in detail).
"' See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 253.
Id. at 255.
14 Koerner, supra note 124, at 769.
141 id.
142 Hartnan,547 U.S. at 252.
143 Id. at 261.
144

id

145

id

Id. at 265.
147 Id. at 265-66.
"

148 Id.

at 261.
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A Bivens action or Section 1983 claim cannot be brought against a
prosecutor because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity regarding
their prosecutorial discretion.149 Instead, the suit must be brought
against another state official, such as the criminal investigator. The
plaintiff must show that the official somehow convinced the prosecutor to engage in the retaliatory prosecution and that the prosecutor
would not have commenced the criminal proceedings without the state
official's urging.15 0 The Court reasoned that demonstrating a lack of
probable cause was the most appropriate method of bridging this causation gap.
The Supreme Court was clear that it was not abandoning the original framework set forth in Mount Healthy for all retaliatory cases, but
it failed to specify when courts should require this heightened pleading standard. Post-Hartman, one commentator has concluded that
"[r]etaliatory arrest case law is a mess," with the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of probable cause,
and others still relying on the burden shifting approach set forth in
Mount Healthy.152
This lack of guidance with retaliatory prosecution and arrest
claims has also prompted a disparity in how the circuits have treated
other retaliation claims, such as retaliatory enforcement. In
CarePartners,the Ninth Circuit rejected the proposed analogy between retaliatory arrest claims and retaliatory enforcement.' 53 In allowing the retaliatory enforcement claim to proceed, the court refused
to require the plaintiff to prove an absence of probable cause on the
part of the regulatory agency's decision to commence enforcement
proceedings. The court limited Hartman to retaliatory prosecution and
arrest claims because Hartman based the higher burden "on the
unique need to 'bridge' a causation gap" between the investigator and
the prosecutor. 154 On the other hand, retaliatory enforcement claims
do not have any independent prosecutorial action because the suit is
filed directly against the regulatory agency that committed the predatory enforcement.15 5 Therefore, retaliatory enforcement claims present
no need to bridge this causation gap. 15 6

149 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
150 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 (2006).
"5' Id at 263.
152 Koerner, supranote 124, at 775.
153 CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 877 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id.
1ss See id.
156 See id.

154
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The CarePartnersdecision followed Skoog v. County of Clackamas, a prior Ninth Circuit opinion in which the court also rejected an
application of Hartman to retaliatory enforcement claims. 15 7 The court
noted that the Supreme Court in Hartman "was careful to explain that
the practical problems of establishing causation in retaliatory prosecution actions motivated its decision, not any need to provide additional
protection to government officials." 158
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit appears to have adopted the heightened Hartman standard for retaliatory enforcement claims.1 5 9 In
Osborne v. Grussing, plaintiffs repeatedly criticized the local county
planning commission for failing to enforce environmental regulations
against a housing development in the area. 60 Subsequent to these
criticisms, the commission investigated allegations that the plaintiffs
themselves had violated local environmental regulations several years
earlier. 16 1 The commission demanded that the plaintiffs implement
costly solutions to remedy the violations.162 Instead of complying, the
plaintiffs filed a Section 1983 claim, alleging that the enforcement
was in retaliation for their criticisms.163
In finding for the commission, the court in Osborne declined to
adopt the burden-shifting approach set forth in Mount Healthy.164
interpreted Mount Healthy to apply only to retaliatory dismissal actions.16 5 Adopting the Hartman standard for retaliatory enforcement
claims, the court held that "a plaintiff who seeks relief from valid adverse regulatory action on the ground that it was unconstitutional retaliation for First Amendment-protected speech must make the same
showing that is required to establish a claim of selective prosecution."l66 To justify this heightened standard in retaliatory enforcement
claims, the court asserted that "we deal here with retaliation claims by
citizens seeking to avoid the consequences of their illegal actions."' 67
The court in Osborne, however, failed to recognize that the reasoning used in Hartman to justify the heightened standard depended
upon characteristics unique to the criminal justice system. These characteristics are not present in retaliatory enforcement claims for two
'5

Skoog v. Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2006).

"58 Id. at 1233.
15
1"
161
162
163
1
165
166
167

Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (2007).
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
id.
Id. at 1006.

id
Id.
Id
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reasons. First, retaliatory enforcement claims have no underlying
criminal proceeding from which to draw probative evidence of probable cause. Plaintiffs asserting retaliatory enforcement claims would be
at a distinct disadvantage without this evidence being provided at the
outset of civil litigation. Second, retaliatory enforcement claims do
not have any independent prosecutorial action because the suit is filed
directly against the regulatory agency that committed the alleged retaliatory enforcement.
Accordingly, neither of the policy arguments from Hartman is relevant to retaliatory enforcement claims. The decisions in CarePartners and Skoog appropriately take into account the limiting guidance
found in Hartman,while Osborne does not. With respect to retaliatory
enforcement claims, the plaintiff should not need to prove an absence
of probable cause.
That is not to say, however, that courts should ignore evidence of
probable cause when it is present. It might be prudent for a court to
consider the presence of probable cause when analyzing whether the
retaliatory motive was a substantial factor in the decision to take enforcement action, if the regulatory agency can demonstrate such probable cause. 168 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court noted in
Hartman's prior appellate history, "[g]iven that probable cause ordinarily suffices to initiate a prosecution, that showing will be enough in
most cases to establish that prosecution would have occurred absent
bad intent." 1 6 9 In other words, the presence of probable cause is strong
evidence that the regulatory agency would have engaged in the predatory enforcement action even in situations where a retaliatory motive
may exist. A court may consider it less likely that the retaliatory motive prompted the enforcement action when evidence of probable
cause is presented by the Defendant. Yet the D.C. Circuit was clear
that a finding of probable cause would not necessitate a favorable
outcome for the regulatory agency. It noted that a plaintiff would still
be able to recover in a Bivens action where they have established a
strong retaliatory motive and the defendant regulatory agency has
only demonstrated weak probable cause.17 0

Contra Koerner, supra note 124, at 782-90 (disagreeing with the advantages of using probable cause as probative evidence).
169 Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
170 id
168
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III. A PUBLIC CONCERN REQUIREMENT AND THE
BALANCING TEST FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING IN PICKERING SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
TO RETALIATORY ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
Regulatory agencies have also argued that retaliatory enforcement
claims should only apply to speech that is a "matter of public concern."17 ' These agencies urge courts to apply the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board ofEducation.172
In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed by the Board
of Education for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the
methods the Board had proposed to raise revenue for the school. 17 3
The teacher challenged the dismissal, arguing that it violated his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.174 The Board of Education argued
that the teacher owed it a duty of loyalty as its employee, and could be
fired for disloyal conduct.' 75 The Court disagreed, holding that a government employee has a First Amendment right to speak on "issues of
public importance"' 76 when the government's interest in limiting the
employee's opportunity to contribute to a public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting "a similar contribution by
any member of the general public."' 7 7
Some Circuits have interpreted Pickeringto stand for the proposition that to prevail in a retaliatory discharge claim, public employees
must demonstrate: (1) that the speech addresses a matter of public
concern, and (2) the government's interest in promoting efficiency of
the services it provides must not outweigh the individual's interest as
a citizen commenting on public matters.
In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood
Academy, the Supreme Court indicated that the Pickering standard
might apply in some retaliatory enforcement claims.17 9 The case in1'
172
173

174

See CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
See id.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
Id. at 565.

"' Id. at 568-69.
171

Id. at 574.

7

Id. at 573.

See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291,
299 (2007) (interpreting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); see also Joseph 0. Oluwole, The
Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Approaches of FederalCircuit Courts ofAppeals, 46 DuQ. L. REv. 133 (2008) (providing a detailed discussion of what constitutes a matter of public concern, and how
the federal circuits apply the Pickeringtest to public employees).
17 Tenn. Secondary, 551 U.S. at 294-300.
17
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volved a private high school that breached state athletic regulations by
recruiting middle school students for its athletic program. 80 The
school asserted that this conduct was speech protected by the First
Amendment.18 1 In alleged retaliation, the state's athletic association
sanctioned the school.1 82 The Court held that the athletic association,
as a state regulatory agency, had an interest in regulating the conduct
of its members similar to a government's interest in regulating the
conduct of its employees.' 8 3 An application of the Pickeringbalancing
test was therefore appropriate. 184 The school's conduct was not subject to constitutional protections, as the Court found that recruiting
student-athletes was not a matter of public concern.
The Ninth Circuit in CarePartners,however, refused to adopt the
Pickering standard for all retaliatory enforcement claims, and distinguished Tennessee Secondary.186 The court noted that "the rationales
underlying the 'public concern' requirement and the Pickeringbalancing test in the employee context do not support the extension of this
analytical framework to the regulated entity context."18 ' For the Pickering public policy considerations to be applicable to retaliation
claims, the sanctions imposed by the government entity would need to
be retaliation against speech that would affect the government entity's
operations.
Pickeringrecognized that the government had interests in controlling the actions of its employees, as any employer would. An analogy
to retaliatory enforcement claims would not have the same public policy implications. Private healthcare organizations and corporations do
not represent the government, nor are they its employees. There is no
need for the government to require the loyalty of independent organizations and private citizens. This analysis is consistent with Connick
v. Myers, where the Supreme Court "discussed the public concern
requirement with specific and limited reference to the field of public
employee speech and explained that it was based on the need to balance government employees' speech rights with the government's
needs as an employer." 8 9 Commentators have also noted that the
s Id at 294.
''

Id. at 295.

182 id

" Id at 299.
1s4

'

See id.

See id. at 299-300.

186 CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
187 id.
188 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
189 CarePartners,545 F.3d at 880 (interpreting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S.
138, 142-44 (1983)).
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Pickeringbalancing test is only appropriate in retaliation cases where
the plaintiff is a "public employee."190 Accordingly, application of
Pickering would be inappropriate in the retaliatory enforcement context within the private sector of the healthcare industry.
This may not hold true though for those healthcare facilities that
are operated or funded by a government entity. For example, the Department of Veteran Affairs runs a hospital system to provide medical
services for US military veterans. 19 1 It is funded exclusively by the
federal government, and constitutes a government entity. Employees
of this healthcare system, therefore, may be subject to a Pickering
balancing test. As previously noted, however, plaintiffs from the private sector bringing retaliatory enforcement claims would not be subject to this heightened pleading standard.

CONCLUSION
This Note provides a comprehensive review of the requirements
necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in a retaliatory enforcement claim
within the healthcare industry. It resolves the divergence across the
federal circuits with respect to the most controversial retaliation element: establishing a causal link between retaliatory motive and the
alleged predatory enforcement. The Supreme Court's "substantial
motivating factor" standard from Mount Healthy strikes an appropriate balance between protecting a healthcare organization's constitutionally protected rights and preserving the government agency's ability to regulate effectively. For this reason, courts should apply this
standard when analyzing retaliatory enforcement claims.
Furthermore, plaintiffs in retaliatory enforcement claims should
not be required to meet the heightened pleading standards set forth in
other types of retaliation cases. In particular, Hartman's applicability
is inappropriate in retaliatory enforcement claims. While courts may
consider evidence of probable cause when determining whether it was
the retaliatory motive that caused the enforcement, plaintiffs in retaliatory enforcement cases should not be required to demonstrate a lack
of probable cause.
With the possible exception of healthcare organizations operated
by or affiliated with government entities, applying the public concern
requirement and the balancing test from Pickering would also be inappropriate in the retaliatory enforcement context. The public policy
See Oluwole, supra note 178, at 173 (emphasis added).
191 Dep't of Veteran Affairs, About VA,
http://www4.va.gov/kids/teachers/multicontent dtl.asp?intPagelD=2&intSideBoxlD=
17&currentgrp=&currentPage=1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
190
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reasons behind employing the Pickering test are not present for private organizations and individuals not employed by the government.
Retaliatory enforcement claims can resolve disputes arising from
the tensions between regulators and business owners, especially in
industries such as nursing homes where conflict is extensive. Regulatory authorities must have the leeway to enforce the laws without reprisal, but damages should be available for plaintiffs in those situations where the enforcement becomes retaliatory in nature and chills
First Amendment activity. An appropriate balance will only be struck
between the interests of these two groups, however, when courts apply
the tests and standards supported by the appropriate underlying policy
reasons discussed in this Note.

